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Abstract
Countries that rely on natural resource rents (that is, the revenue generated from the sale 
of natural resources) may suffer from a variety of social problems. This exploratory study 
reviews the natural resource extraction literature to derive a ‘natural resource rents–homicide’ 
hypothesis. Data for 173 countries for the years 2000 to 2012 are examined to determine if 
there is a correlation between natural resource rents and homicide rates. Multilevel growth 
models suggest that natural resource rents are positively correlated with homicide rates within 
countries (level 1) but not between them (level 2). Importantly, the correlation between natural 
resource rents and homicide is strongest when natural resource rents are lagged. We conclude 
by suggesting that increasing natural resource rents may be counterproductive over the long run 
and sow the seeds for a future increase in homicide.
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Introduction
Recent studies have found that excessive dependence on natural resource extraction rev-
enue tends to be associated with elevated levels of crime in local settings (for example, 
Archbold et al., 2014; Carrington et al., 2011; Price et al., 2014; Ruddell, 2011; Ruddell 
et al., 2014). The major implication of these studies is that higher rates of crime are the 
result of detrimental social processes that are set in motion by a sudden increase in 
extraction development followed by a heavy reliance on revenue generated from natural 
resources. As yet, however, community-level findings that postulate a relationship 
between natural resource revenue and crime have not been replicated cross-nationally 
(except see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This observation raises the following question: 
is there a cross-national correlation between revenue that is generated by natural resource 
extraction and crime? To help answer this question we study one type of crime (that is, 
homicide rates) and natural resource rents. Homicide is one of the most valid and reliable 
cross-national crime indicators (see Neapolitan, 1997), and natural resource rents (NRR) 
are often used in development studies as an indicator of the amount of revenue generated 
by natural resources (less the cost of extracting those resources) that comes from their 
sale in the international market (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). As a result, we test the 
hypotheses that NRR (as a percentage of gross domestic product) and homicide rates are 
positively correlated between and within countries.1
The present study begins by exploring the theoretical justification for the NRR–
homicide hypotheses. Specifically, to derive our hypotheses we rely upon two sets of 
literature. First, we explore community-level studies that document the relationship 
between extraction-related economic activity and crime. Second, we examine cross-
national level research by drawing upon the ‘the natural resource curse’ lens that stipu-
lates countries with high NRR face more development-related problems than countries 
with low NRR. Within that natural resource curse literature we pay particular attention to 
the idea that high NRR countries may potentially harm the economy and encourage civil 
violence. We employ a multilevel growth model to test the correlation between NRR and 
homicide for 173 countries for the years 2000 to 2012. We then conclude by reflecting 
upon our findings in the context of the environmental justice literature and the potential 
for future research.
Exploring the potential effect of resource extraction on crime cross-nationally is 
important for two reasons. First, policy-makers across the globe regularly make deci-
sions about the pace and extent of resource extraction to generate NRR. Information 
about the potential homicide–NRR association might be useful to policy-makers and 
affect the kinds of economic policies they select. Second, if a relationship between NRR 
and homicide exists, then criminal justice agencies faced with implementing enforce-
ment practices may consider how to use NRR information to better advocate for and 
distribute resources to combat crime (Archbold, 2015).
Background
Extractive activities consist of the removal of raw materials from nature (for example, coal, 
oil, gas, timber and minerals). These extraction efforts are often promoted by companies 
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and governments, and are designed to stimulate revenue for economic development pur-
poses. Local and national governments that are dependent on high NRR may suffer adverse 
social and economic consequences. For instance, Adger (2000: 361) suggests that too 
much reliance on NRR increases vulnerability to external shocks such as the volatility of 
raw material commodity prices. Jacquet (2014: 8321) describes four general types of prob-
lem that occur from an over-reliance on NRR: ‘(1) rapid industrialization and loss of gov-
ernance, (2) uneven distribution of costs and benefits, (3) conflict, and (4) social-psychological 
stress and disruption.’ These potential adverse outcomes have led a variety of sociologists 
and development scholars to investigate the relationship between high NRR economies 
and wellbeing in the case of timber (Fisher, 2001; Wunder, 2001), oil (Obi, 2010), coal 
(Perdue and Pavela, 2012) and mineral mining (Pegg, 2006). Together these wellbeing 
studies suggest that a variety of social problems, including homicide, are likely to occur 
when governments and policy-makers pursue high NRR to boost economic growth.
Community studies
Carrington, Hogg and McIntosh (2011: 353) propose that communities that rely on high 
levels of NRR experience greater levels of violence. That is, extractive economies dis-
rupt social life in such a way that crime is more likely to occur. As a result, NRR can 
threaten community norms and values and therefore break informal ties and harm com-
munity services (Carrington et al., 2011; see also England and Albrecht, 1984; 
Freudenburg and Jones, 1991; Hunter et al., 2002; Wilkinson, 1991). However, it is not 
just a matter of elevated NRR promoting crimes such as homicide. It is also a matter of 
rapid social change that may occur in areas of high NRR. For instance, as Durkheim sug-
gested in the 19th century with his concept of anomie, rapid social change disrupts com-
munity organization and attenuates social bonds, creating a sense of normlessness in the 
community that often leads to increases in crime (Durkheim, 2014 [1902]; see also 
Messner, 1989, for an empirical application to homicide rates).
The idea of social disorganization is often used to describe the condition faced by 
communities that undergo a rapid transition to an NRR-based economy (Ruddell et al., 
2014). The increase in urbanization, industrialization and immigration that occurs along 
with rapid expansion of NRR may break social bonds and threaten conventional com-
munity beliefs and values. This disorganization can then lead to an increase in crime and 
delinquency (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Jacquet (2014: 8321) 
makes the connection between natural resource extraction and crime, drawing directly 
on concepts used in the social disorganization literature, suggesting that the loss of close-
knit social ties can result in a loss of institutions (church groups, neighbourhood associa-
tions, etc.) that historically provide informal control over social problems including 
crime, drug abuse and mental illness, instead requiring formal organizations such as the 
police and court system to address these problems. Ruddell et al. (2014) propose that 
social disorganization may increase during a natural resource boom, and that is what 
leads to observed increases in crime. Anecdotal observations appear to confirm Ruddell 
et al.’s (2014: 4) supposition, as reports by some law enforcement officials and residents 
of high extraction communities suggest that a ‘violent element’ is attracted to the employ-
ment opportunities brought on by rapid resource extraction that promotes social 
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disorganization. As a result of these changes, communities that quickly become reliant 
on NRR are sometimes called ‘energy boom towns’.
Energy boom towns may also face rapid population growth, industrialization and fly-
in, fly-out (FIFO) patterns of predominately male workers (Ruddell et al., 2014). This 
pattern of community development disrupts the normal patterns of life in the mostly rural 
areas where extraction takes place. The new residents and FIFO workers often cause 
problems for long-time residents, such as unemployment, increases in social-psycholog-
ical stress and substance abuse (Jacquet, 2014). The transient nature of the workforce 
that migrates into quickly developing NRR economies may even create stress for local 
services because those employed in the industry often work shifts around the clock, dis-
rupting families where increases in violent crimes such as domestic abuse have been 
reported (Carrington et al., 2011).
As noted, the rapid growth of extraction revenue may attract people seeking various 
types of work that ‘disrupt normal patterns of interaction’ (Ruddell et al., 2014: 3). Not 
surprisingly, changes in community values also affects the way that law enforcement 
responds to crime, reducing community service functions and increasing law enforce-
ment functions. That is, police become more focused on catching and arresting criminals 
while reluctantly allowing minor disorder to flourish (Archbold, 2015).
Several empirical studies draw upon the social disorganization thesis to test the rela-
tionship between NRR and crime. As previously noted, these studies generally indicate 
that high-NRR economies also tend to have elevated levels of crime (for example, 
Archbold et al., 2014; Ruddell et al., 2014). For instance, recent research by Price et al. 
(2014) uncovers a relationship between the number of gas extraction wells (which pre-
sumably correlate to higher levels of NRR) and crime across local communities. The 
relationship between NRR and crime at the community level of analysis has also been 
observed within other developed countries such as Australia and Canada (Carrington 
et al., 2011; Ruddell, 2011).
A few studies propose that there is no correlation between NRR and crime (Wilkinson 
et al., 1982). Ruddell et al. (2014), for instance, found that although increases in NRR 
activity were followed by increases in index crime, high-NRR communities had similar 
index crime rates to low-NRR communities. Thus, Ruddell et al.’s results indicate that, 
in the case of homicide rates, it is the change in NRR and not the absolute level of NRR 
that matters. In addition, Hunter, Krannich and Smith (2002) point out that, although 
communities that pursue high levels of NRR as an economic strategy could eventually 
recover from elevated levels of NRR-related crime, perceptions of crime would be most 
intense for those socially disadvantaged residents living in high-NRR communities.
In sum, previous community-level research highlights how elevated and increasing 
NRR can foster disorganization. In turn, disorganization weakens community social 
bonds and creates individual and community-level stress that produces the right condi-
tions for crime, including violence and homicide.
Cross-national studies
Whereas problems associated with natural resource extraction are largely studied at the 
community level, the focus of this research is cross-national. As community scholars 
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note, however, the same social processes that disrupt and disorganize communities may 
also be at work within and across countries. When studying extraction in communities, 
Freudenburg (1992: 307) proposed that ‘newly industrializing nations [may also suffer 
from natural resource addiction because] extractive activities are seen as having the 
potential to open up entire regions to economic development’.
Cross-national literature on the problems associated with NRR as a form of develop-
ment can be broadly broken down into those studies that focus on economic growth and 
those that focus on civil unrest and violence. In 1990, Auty suggested that some countries 
experience the ‘curse of natural resources’.2 Like community-level research, the natural 
resource curse hypothesis proposes that development problems are likely to arise in 
economies that rely heavily on NRR.3 Shortly after Auty developed this thesis, Sachs and 
Warner used empirical data to study the effects of the resource curse, noting specifically 
that a ‘surprising [feature] of modern economic growth is that economies with abundant 
natural resources grow less rapidly than natural-resource-scarce economies’ (1995: 1). 
Their research demonstrates that developing countries with high levels of natural 
resource exports (for example oil, minerals and agriculture), expressed as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1970, tended to experience slower economic growth 
over the next decade (see also Sachs and Warner 1997, 1999). Importantly, Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1997) show that only 2 countries rich in natural resources (Malaysia and 
Mauritius) out of 19 did not experience a decline in GDP during the 1970s. The primary 
reasons that Sachs and Warner (2001) give for this general undesirable relationship is 
that countries rich in natural resources may be harming GDP by disrupting more tradi-
tional manufacturing growth. In other words, increases in natural resource extraction 
may quickly elevate wages and product prices within countries, making it harder for 
manufacturing to compete with other exports in the global marketplace. Sachs and 
Warner (2001: 833) note that, ‘[w]hatever the cause [for lower GDP], it is clear that we 
have not seen strong export-led growth in resource abundant economies’.
The implications of these economic problems have also led scholars to think about the 
relationship between NRR and homicide. Specifically, comparative researchers believe 
that NRR may produce a variety of social problems, including violence (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002). This more recent strand of research is similar to what is being proposed 
by community-level scholars – that the resource curse may create conflict and violence 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007; Ross, 2003; Skaperdas, 
2002). Violence related to natural resources that occurs globally has garnered significant 
attention in the press, especially when related to conflicts over resources such as oil and 
minerals. In the popular press these conflicts are sometimes framed to highlight the vio-
lence behind their production and extraction (Eligon, 2011). For example, ‘blood dia-
monds’ or ‘conflict timber’ illustrate the social harm associated with the extraction of 
certain forms of natural resources (Mullins and Rothe 2008; Orogun, 2004; Van Solinge 
2008). Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) also found ‘a diamonds curse’, indicating 
that, in the case of secondary diamonds, there was an increase in the likelihood of ethnic 
fighting.4 For example, murders and missing persons in Colombia are all too often asso-
ciated with the capture of productive lands for the purpose of extracting palm oil (Borras 
and Franco, 2010a, 2010b). As a result, conflict over land associated with valuable natu-
ral resources may quickly lead to elevated murder rates (Myers, 1997). Moreover, as 
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Downey, Bonds and Clark (2010) suggest, there are many different forms of extraction 
(for example mining and timber) that may encourage violence and murder in some 
countries.
There are some additional reasons that NRR may generate violence at a cross-national 
level. First, some researchers describe violence as a function of ‘looting rebels’ (Mildner 
et al., 2011). That is, in nation-states with weak governments, rebels can forcibly and 
violently take NRR as a method of funding political conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 
625) conclude that NRR generate ‘low opportunity costs for rebellion and make civil war 
more likely’. Moreover, NRR reliance may challenge weak governments because law 
enforcement is strained and cannot provide protection in areas that can potentially gener-
ate high amounts of resource revenue. Thus, as Ross (2003: 25) contends, ‘this opens the 
door for criminal gangs, warlords, and rogue military officers’.
To date, there is only one academic study that examines the association between NRR 
and homicide rates at the cross-national level (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Specifically, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) studied deliberate killings and civil war deaths as a function 
of NRR.5 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) hypothesize that civil war deaths and homicides 
are likely to share predictors (that is, independent variables). The researchers conduct a 
cross-sectional analysis that illustrates important differences between the dependent 
variables. Specifically, they find that both ethnic dominance and NRR are positively cor-
related with the risk of civil war and that neither variable is correlated with homicide. 
Nevertheless, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that this finding requires further 
empirical investigation.
In sum, the literature on the impact of natural resource extraction and the resultant 
rents suggests the following two hypotheses, which we test in this article.
Hypothesis 1: Annual increases in a country’s natural resource rents are associated with annual 
increases in the country’s homicide rents (that is, the within-country hypothesis).
Hypothesis 2: Countries with higher average natural resource rents will have higher homicide 
rates compared with countries with lower natural resource rents (that is, the between-country 
hypothesis).
Methods
We examine the cross-national correlation between NRR and homicide rates using mul-
tilevel models for change. This procedure models one dependent variable and multiple 
independent variables (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). 
Multilevel change models are particularly appropriate for examining the relationship 
between NRR and homicide because they allow for the simultaneous estimations of 
year-to-year changes within individual countries (level 1) as well as between countries 
(level 2). Thus, we can assess the important question of whether NRR appear to facilitate 
homicide over time (within country), across space (between countries), or both. As per 
convention, we control for year in all of the statistical models.
We gathered data on natural resource extraction and other competing explanations of 
homicide for the years 2000 to 2012 for the 173 countries for which homicide and natural 
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Figure 1. The natural log of homicide rates, 2000–12 (n = 828).
resource data were available over time (listed in Appendix 1). All of the variables used in 
our regression models of homicide are described below, with descriptive statistics for the 
overall sample presented in Appendix 2 and the between- and within-country variances 
listed in Appendix 3. We now turn to the description of the variables used in our 
models.
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the homicide rate, measured as homicides per 100,000 per-
sons. We focus our analysis on homicide rates because community and cross-national 
studies suggest that violence may be related to NRR and because homicide data are 
widely acknowledged to be the most valid and reliable cross-national indicator of vio-
lence (Neapolitan, 1997). As a result, it is possible to examine the variability in the homi-
cide rate per country and per year (2000 to 2012).
The total number of homicides per country, per year was extracted from the Global 
Study on Homicide 2013 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014), which 
compiles world homicide statistics over time. Data in this report are derived from crimi-
nal justice or public health systems and are verified through validity checks (see United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014: 110–11). These data intend to measure all 
recorded ‘unlawful deaths purposefully inflicted on a person by another person’ (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014: 109). Because the distribution of homicide 
data is substantially non-normal across countries over time (skewness = 2.5, kurtosis = 
7.7), we take the natural log of the variable to produce a better-fitting regression line and 
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more normally distributed regression residuals. As noted in Figure 1, the distribution of 
the transformed homicide rate variable is relatively normal – even if slightly bimodal 
(skewness = 0.20, kurtosis = −0.79).
The natural log of homicide improves model fit substantially and reduced the stand-
ard error estimates at both level 1 and level 2, allowing for a better test of the natural 
resource curse–homicide hypothesis between and within countries.
Natural resource extraction
We are interested in determining whether NRR is correlated with homicide rates between 
and/or within countries. Thus, we collected data on NRR for each country over time as a 
way to estimate the extent of extraction activity in a country as well as to measure how 
much a particular country relies on revenue generated from the sale of natural resources. 
NRR are one common measure of extraction relative to revenue. NRR data represent the 
surplus value or economic profits as a percentage of GDP that results from the sale of 
non-renewable natural resources (oil, gas, coal, minerals and timber). NRR, as a portion 
of GDP, are also often used as a measure of natural resource wealth in the natural resource 
curse literature (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). As previously noted, as NRR increase, hom-
icide should also increase because this form of economic development harms social life 
and leads to disruption and disorganization in communities and countries. Moreover, 
high NRR may promote political conflict between some countries at the national level. 
The NRR data are also highly skewed and peaked (skewness = 2.41, kurtosis = 4.36) 
because some countries rely heavily on NRR and others virtually not at all. As a result, 
we take the natural log of NRR because it helps to correct for the non-linear relationships 
that emerge between NRR and homicide (skewness = 0.71, kurtosis = 1.78). NRR data 
are available from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org; see also Hamilton and 
Clemens, 1998, for further discussion of NRR).
Control variables
Several variables that might have an impact on the relationship between NRR and homi-
cide must be controlled in the statistical analysis of NRR and homicides. Based on prior 
studies, GDP is one major variable that needs to be controlled in the analysis of homicide 
rates. GDP per capita across countries over time is collected from the World Bank and 
measured in thousands of US dollars per person. It is the market value of production, 
services and sales. The relationship between GDP and homicide is mixed in the litera-
ture, which finds positive, negative and no relationship between the variables (Pridemore 
and Trent, 2010). We also control for income inequality using the Gini index. The Gini 
index is obtained from the World Bank dataset and is frequently used as a measure of 
income inequality in social science research (http://data.worldbank.org). Gini is noted to 
be positively correlated with homicide rates in cross-national studies (Barber, 2006; 
Bjerregaard and Cochran, 2008; Nivette, 2011).
We control for three additional economic variables that were also collected from the 
World Bank. First, we control for the percentage of unemployed in each country each 
year since this variable has also been linked with homicide rates (Huang, 2001). That is, 
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as unemployment increases across countries, so does homicide. Second, infant mortality 
is controlled when testing the relationship between NRR and homicide. Infant mortality 
measures the number of infants who die before the age of 1 per 1000 live births. Infant 
mortality is an indicator of poverty that should be positively associated with homicide 
rates between and within countries. Finally, foreign direct investment (FDI) is controlled 
and is an indicator of the direct investment of equity capital and the reinvestment of earn-
ings into the economy as a proportion of GDP. Direct investment is typically not exam-
ined in homicide studies, but could drive NRR that impact on homicide rates. As a result, 
we examine the relationship between direct investments before NRR are included in the 
analysis to see if it is a potential mechanism that helps specify the relationship between 
NRR and homicide.
In addition to economic controls, we include five population indicators, one indicator 
of governance and one regional indicator. The percentage of the population in each coun-
try residing in an urban area is obtained from the World Bank and controlled in the analy-
sis because increased urbanization has been linked to elevated homicide rates in some 
cross-national studies (Fischer, 1975). It is also an indicator of social disorganization 
because it has been argued that increases in urbanization are related to increases in crime. 
Population, measured in billions of residents, is also controlled in the analysis and allows 
us to assess if more populated countries or countries that grow in population also experi-
ence higher homicide rates. To account for age structure and gender we include the per-
centage of the population aged 0–14 years, the percentage of the population aged 15–64 
years and the percentage of the population that is female.6 Democracy is examined as a 
control variable and is measured using the report Freedom in the World, produced by 
Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world). The database 
documents each country’s political freedom in a ‘freedom index’ over time, using a rat-
ing that ranges from ‘1’ (most free) to ‘7’ (least free). We reverse-coded the democracy 
variable so higher values represent countries that have higher political freedom. We also 
include a measure of corruption, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI; Transparency 
International, 2016). The CPI is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 
10 (very clean). We reverse-coded CPI so higher values represent higher levels of cor-
ruption. Finally, the region of the world in which a country is located is included only in 
the between effects portion of the analysis, divided into the seven categories available in 
the World Bank data (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia Pacific, Europe Central Asia, Latin 
America Caribbean, Middle East North and North Africa, North America and South 
America). This variable is entered into the analysis as a dummy variable and the refer-
ence category is Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix 2).
Analysis
To test the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between NRR and homicide 
rates we use data for the 173 countries listed in Appendix 1 for the years 2000–12. Table 
1 presents multilevel growth model estimates that test the viability of the notion that 
NRR and homicide are related. As noted, level-1 variables allow us to estimate the values 
of each variable at a specific year, and the level-2 variables average the values of the 
variable (that is, a grand mean centred) for each country from 2000 to 2012. In Table 1 
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we estimate three multilevel growth models for homicide rates. The first model (Model 
1) examines the relationship between a five-year lag of NRR and homicide controlling 
Table 1. Multilevel growth model coefficients of cross-national homicide rate for all countries, 
2000–12.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Level 1: Within country  
Natural resource rents (lag) 0.076 (0.019)*** 0.040 (0.019)*
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 0.245 (0.268) −0.563 (0.397)
GDP per capita (US$ 000) −0.025 (0.020) 0.042 (0.034)
Foreign direct investment (as percent of GDP) −0.344 (1.279) 0.711 (1.364)
Percent unemployed −0.001 (0.004) −0.002 (0.005)
Democracy (Freedom Index) 0.032 (0.017) 0.025 (0.021)
Population (billion) −0.716 (0.941) −0.028 (1.758)
Percent urban 0.031 (0.006)*** 0.021 (0.011)
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 0.049 (0.019)** 0.049 (0.025)*
Percent aged 0–14 years 0.006 (0.024) −0.049 (0.036)
Percent aged 15–64 years 0.047 (0.021)* −0.001(0.033)
Percent female 0.039 (0.048) −0.112 (0.060)
Year −0.015 (0.004)*** −0.033 (0.006)*** −0.046 (0.009)***
Level 2: Between countries  
Natural resource rents (lag) 0.010 (0.036) −0.011 (0.054)
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) −1.324 (0.523)* −0.648 (0.598)
GDP per capita (US$ 000) 0.047 (0.092) −0.004 (0.099)
Foreign direct investment (as percent of GDP) 12.762 (12.57) 11.60 (12.71)
Inequality index (Gini) 0.029 (0.010)** 0.031 (0.011)**
Percent unemployed 0.030 (0.011)** 0.031 (0.012)**
Democracy (Freedom Index) −0.060 (0.045) −0.030 (0.049)
Population (billion) 1.095 (1.010) 0.288 (1.832)
Percent urban −0.029 (0.008)*** −0.019 (0.013)
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 0.011 (0.068) 0.033 (0.071)
Percent aged 0–14 years 0.119 (0.037)** 0.170 (0.047)***
Percent aged 15–64 years 0.040 (0.041) 0.079 (0.050)
Percent female 0.450 (0.087)*** 0.579 (0.096)***
Region (vs. Sub-Saharan Africa)  
 East Asia Pacific −1.196 (0.211)*** −0.361 (0.360) −0.372 (0.364)
 Europe Central Asia −1.361 (0.175)*** −0.330 (0.373) −0.290 (0.379)
 Latin America Caribbean 0.651 (0.192)** 0.481 (0.291) 0.552 (0.293)
 Middle East North Africa −1.751 (0.216)*** −0.832 (0.368) −0.713 (0.387)
 North America −1.126 (0.553)* 0.313 (0.512) 0.377 (0.517)
 South America −0.954 (0.314)** 0.237 (0.348) 0.287 (0.353)
Constant 31.90 (7.925)*** 32.32 (14.01)* 60.21 (18.83)**
−2LL −246.354 −54.168 −29.14
AIC 516.708 174.336 128.279
BIC 573.264 332.594 281.938
N 823 894 596
No. of countries 169 112 111
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); standard errors are in parentheses.
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only for region and year. We estimate the five-year lag of rents for theoretical and empiri-
cal reasons. That is, we rely on the natural resource curse literature, which notes that the 
impact of any resource curse is delayed rather than immediate (Ross, 2003). Also impor-
tant, as noted below, is that the five-year lag produces the best-fitting model of NRR and 
homicide. We return to the issue of lagging NRR below, however, suggesting that, if 
social disruption and disorganization intensify over time, the lag in NRR produces the 
strongest correlation and is theoretically justified. Model 2 displays results for the impact 
of the control variables on homicide. Model 3 combines Model 1 and Model 2 variables 
to show the impact of NRR on homicide while controlling for typical variables used in 
cross-national analysis.
Missing data
As noted earlier, cross-national homicide data are the most available and reliable cross-
national crime indicator. However, it still suffers from missing data, particularly when 
employing longitudinal analysis (Neapolitan, 1997). In order to add validity to our find-
ings we examined the distribution of missing data in the dataset for patterns and then 
employed several modelling strategies.
The frequency of missing cases for each variable is reported in Appendix 4. It is clear 
that homicide rates have a substantial number of missing values (n = 915). This is poten-
tially problematic, but it is the reality of modelling cross-national homicide rates longi-
tudinally. Several independent variables (that is Gini, percent unemployed, democracy 
and corruption) also have a number of missing values. The Gini index has a very large 
percentage of missing values (72.48 percent), suggesting that perhaps it should be elimi-
nated from the models. We did not include it in the level-1 portion of the models for this 
reason; however, because the level-2 models are averaged between effects, we were able 
to keep it in level 2. Recall, level-2 coefficients are the average effects of the variable 
over the time period under study, 2000–12. Since every country in the model had a least 
one value of the Gini index during that time period, there are no missing values of Gini 
at level 2. We next employed the Stata 13.1 command – misstable pattern – to the data-
set, which produces an analysis of all the different permutations of missing values. The 
three most common patterns of missing data in the dataset are, (1) values of all variables 
except missing Gini (n = 504), (2) values of all variables except missing Gini and homi-
cide (n = 388) and (3) values of all variables except missing Gini, homicide and corrup-
tion (n = 117). All other permutations of missing data patterns had fewer than 100 cases. 
As noted, missing Gini values do not affect the results because it is not included in 
level-1 results, and missing homicide values are a common limitation to cross-national 
homicide studies (Neapolitan, 1997). However, the majority of existing cross-national 
studies are cross-sectional; in our longitudinal study the missing values have less of an 
impact on the results because we are modelling change. For example, if a country is 
missing a value for the corruption indicator for 2001, the multilevel change model will 
ignore the missing value and model the corruption change for that country between 2000 
and 2002. Additionally, there are not missing values at level 2 for any of the variables 
because they are average values for 2000–12.
 at Northumbria University on August 31, 2016euc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
12 European Journal of Criminology 
To further validate our results we modelled the data in three ways. First, we used 
listwise deletion and removed any country from the analysis that had a missing value on 
any variable. We next restricted the results to cases that had no missing values of NRR. 
Finally, we used the mi suite of commands in Stata to impute all missing values of all the 
independent variables in the analysis. The findings for the NRR variable were very simi-
lar in each method of analysis, resulting in the coefficients having the same level of sta-
tistical significance in each approach. We report the models from the first approach 
(listwise deletion) here.
Results
Model 1 (Table 1) suggests that NRR are related to homicide, but only within countries 
(level 1) and not between them (level 2). That is, within countries the correlation between 
the natural log of NRR and the natural log of the homicide rate is .076 (p < .001; two-
tailed). More specifically, a one unit annual change in the log of NRR is associated with 
a .076 unit annual change in the log of the homicide rate. As a result, Model 1 (level 1) 
suggests that, when examining the bivariate association between NRR and homicide 
rates, the two variables are positively correlated within (and not between) countries.
Model 2 – the control variable model – finds that several predictors are significantly 
related to NRR. Increases in the percentage of the population residing in urban areas are 
associated with increases in homicide rates (level 1). Governments that become more 
corrupt within countries experience associated increases in homicide rates (level 1). 
Increases in the percentage of the population aged 15–64 years are associated with 
increases in homicide rates (level 1). Income inequality is also positively correlated with 
homicide rates across countries (level 2) and implies that countries with high levels of 
income inequality also tend to have higher homicide rates. Percentage unemployed, per-
centage 0–14 years and percentage female are all positively correlated with homicide 
rates between countries (level 2). Interestingly, GDP per capita is not significantly related 
to homicide rates either within or between countries. This is not surprising because 
cross-national studies of homicide have found negative, positive and no significant rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and homicide rates (Pridemore and Trent, 2010), indi-
cating that this relationship is empirically unclear.
Level-2 (Model 2) results for infant mortality and percentage urban are unusual. 
Infant mortality, an indicator of poverty, is negatively related to homicide rates in Model 
2 (level 2), a strange finding given that poverty should be related to homicide rates across 
countries (Pridemore, 2008). Model 2 also suggests an odd finding for percentage urban. 
Specifically, countries with higher percentages of population residing in urban areas 
have lower homicide rates compared with countries with smaller urban populations. The 
remaining control variables (FDI, democracy and region) do not appear to be correlated 
with homicide rates.
Importantly, Model 3 (Table 1) provides support for the position that NRR continue 
to be correlated with homicide even after controlling for important factors that may influ-
ence homicide rates across countries. That is, according to Model 3 (level 1) a one unit 
annual change in the log of NRR is associated with a 0.040 unit annual change in the log 
of the homicide rate. The addition of NRR to Model 2 also helps explain the odd findings 
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for infant mortality and percentage urban (both at level 2). Specifically, infant mortality 
and percentage urban become statistically insignificant in Model 3 (level 2) when NRR 
are included in the model, suggesting the relationship in Model 2 may have been a result 
of model misspecification. In the case of infant mortality, this finding perhaps implies 
that NRR may influence both poverty and homicide – a result that is consistent with the 
natural resource curse literature. That is, the changes in the type of development matter 
when it comes to homicide rates. Importantly, then, it appears that, within countries when 
relevant predictors of homicide are included in the model, only the type of economic 
development (natural resource rents) is related to homicide rates at level 1.
The results for NRR at level 2 (Model 3) are also important. The correlation between 
NRR and homicide remains non-existent at level 2 (Model 3), signifying that it is the 
change in NRR as opposed to the level of NRR that matters. It is interesting to note that 
these results are similar to the Ruddell et al.’s (2014) community-level findings that there 
are no differences between local communities that engage in natural resource extraction 
and those that do not, but those communities that do engage in extraction observe 
increases in crime over time. Thus, local findings appear to be supported at the cross-
national level in Table 1.
The relationship between NRR and homicide requires some additional attention. That 
is, if NRR and homicide are correlated, how does that correlation emerge over time? As 
previously noted, we lagged NRR to examine the relationship between NRR and homi-
cide. Figure 2 examines that lag in more detail – seeking to identify potential patterns in 
the relationship between NRR and homicide. An identified pattern in this relationship is 
Figure 2. Relationship between natural resource rents (lagged by 0 to 11 years) and homicide 
rates.
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important because it indicates whether countries may simply live with an increasing 
homicide rate over the short term. That is, if the relationship between NRR and homicide 
becomes weak over time, that might suggest that countries that adopt natural resource 
related development as a form of economic development simply need to ‘wait it out’. 
Since higher-extraction countries do not appear to have higher homicide rates, as indi-
cated in Table 1, the within-country potential impact of increases in homicide rates may 
be short lived. Next, we investigate whether NRR is likely to have a delayed impact, by 
examining the correlation between its lag and homicide rates. The lagged analysis helps 
to determine if the potential impact of NRR on homicide is short lived (assuming such a 
relationship does indeed exist, as Table 1 suggests).
Figure 2 charts the level-1 coefficients for each lag of NRR on homicide in a multi-
level model that controls for region, income inequality and the Gini index. The figure 
shows that the relationship between homicide rates and NRR is complex in that it 
emerges gradually over time. For example, at level 1 the relationship between that log of 
NRR and homicide – controlling for GDP, Gini and region – is not statistically signifi-
cant until NRR is lagged by three years (coefficient = .04; p < .05). However, the associa-
tion gradually increases so that by year 10 the association between NRR and homicide is 
.08 (p < .05). Thus, although it appears that having high levels of NRR is not a problem, 
countries that increase their reliance on NRR appear to create a significant problem over 
the long run with respect to increasing homicide rates. That is, it appears that the impact 
of increases in NRR matter for homicide rates in the future.
Conclusion
Community- and country-level studies suggest that an overreliance on NRR may pro-
duce crime and violence. As an extension of this position we argued that a reliance on 
NRR may disrupt and disorganize social life and lead to higher levels of homicide. We 
tested the NRR–homicide hypothesis at the country level for the years 2000 to 2012 by 
examining the correlation between NRR and homicide rates. Our multilevel findings 
suggest that there is a correlation between NRR and homicide rates, but that correlation 
exists only with respect to changing reliance on NRR within countries. That is, the rela-
tionship between NRR and homicide does not appear between countries and high-
extraction countries do not, on average, tend to have higher homicide rates. As a result, 
the NRR–homicide hypothesis suggests that within-country trends in NRR and homi-
cide are positively correlated over time, whereas the between-country NRR–homicide 
hypothesis was rejected. This is an interesting finding because it suggests that rapid 
increases in NRR increase homicide, but that overall levels of NRR do not. To illustrate 
these different patterns it is helpful to briefly examine two specific countries. 
Guatemala’s homicide rate increased from 25.9 to 39.9 between 2000 and 2012, and its 
NRR increased from 2.4 percent to 4.2 percent over the same time frame. Guatemala’s 
NRR and homicide rates both almost doubled, demonstrating the within-group cross-
national finding at a national level; that is, rapid increases in NRR are associated with 
rapid increases in homicide rates. In contrast, in 2012, Saudi Arabia’s NRR was 48.18 
percent, indicating that almost half of the entire country’s GDP comes from NRR. 
However, in the same year, Saudi Arabia’s homicide rate was 0.8, one of the lowest of 
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all countries in the dataset. As we found by failing to reject the between-country hypoth-
eses, just because Saudi Arabia has a very high NRR value this does not mean that it 
will also have a high homicide rate. The effect of NRR comes when there is a rapid 
change in rents, not the overall value of the NRR.
The potential role of NRR in organizing homicide rates has implications for policy-
makers who might be contemplating a shift to heavy reliance on NRR for development. 
First, although it is often assumed that natural resource extraction is unsustainable and 
leads to economic harm and environmental destruction over the long run, we believe 
there is an additional reason for caution. Specifically, although NRR may stimulate 
revenue in the short run it can also lead to increases in social problems, such as homi-
cide, over the long run. There is no evidence to suggest that countries with high extrac-
tion rates have high homicide rates, but there is reason to suspect that social change 
– especially related to development – may contribute to changes in homicide. In some 
respects our findings regarding NRR sum up the essential nature of developmental 
change (that is, Durkheim, 2014 [1902]). That is, significant levels of social and eco-
nomic change – and not the end result of that change – are what produce social prob-
lems such as homicide.
Second, if there is a relationship between NRR and homicide, then social institutions 
(for example, law enforcement) are likely to require more state support in countries that 
begin to shift their economies toward NRR-based economies (Archbold et al., 2014). 
However, extensively extractive economies are often viewed as overtly oppressive and 
many have been accused of using direct and forcible control to facilitate extraction. This 
situation is likely to raise human rights issues because state power may be directed 
toward facilitating state violence to increase NRR rather than reducing social violence to 
promote development. Although we do not have the space in this article, future research 
should examine whether development centred on NRR also promotes political violence, 
rather than the relatively non-political crime of homicide as it is measure in this study. 
Nevertheless, it could certainly be argued that the developed countries using extracted 
resources should be paying the costs associated with combating the additional homicide 
they create. This is even more important because countries that turn to NRR as a form of 
development are probably the least likely to adequately support state services that might 
serve to reduce violence. This particular situation could be viewed through an environ-
mental justice lens, suggesting that environmental extraction produces harmful outcomes 
that are most likely to be imposed on less developed countries. In the end we argue that 
the role of natural resource extraction and the NRR–homicide hypothesis needs more 
serious consideration in cross-national studies of homicide because it may be counter-
productive to the development process. We hope our findings have generated more inter-
est in such research and recommend two areas for potential future study.
First, NRR are likely to vary by a country’s location in the international economy 
(Wallerstein, 1974), and underdeveloped as well as some developing nations are more 
likely to have economies linked to NRR than are developed nations. Scholars have 
argued that the majority of revenue generated from NRR does not help local economies; 
rather, because the extraction was funded by FDI, most of the profit leaves the local area 
and often the entire country (see Stiglitz, 2002: 67–73). This suggests that future research 
needs to examine the effects of foreign capital on social disorganization and homicide.
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We not only find that countries with higher NRR have slightly higher homicide rates 
in general, but also suggest that within highly extractive countries an association between 
NRR and homicide is most likely to exist over time. As a result, it is possible that the 
effect of NRR on crime may harm some nations and not others, and that further analysis 
of this issue is required. Unfortunately, data on homicide are least likely to be collected 
in countries that are underdeveloped and have high NRR. We are not the first researchers 
to face data problems with respect to missing data among poorer countries with respect 
to cross-national homicide rates. Thus, future studies might look to various indicators of 
violence that better capture the impact of developmental change on homicide and vio-
lence more generally in less economically developed countries.
Second, our study examines the impact of NRR on homicide over only a relatively 
short period of time (13 years). That is, the true social impacts and cumulative nature of 
resource-based economies may not be realized for decades after the increases in NRR 
occur. Current limitations in cross-national homicide data (and control variables) do not 
allow for an expanded look at long-term cross-national homicide trends yet. However, as 
data continue to become available this relationship should be monitored. Although there 
are considerable calls for alternative energy development and use across the globe, we 
anticipate that rates of extraction of coal, oil and gas will continue to increase for some 
time because the demand for energy in the global economy has shown few signs of con-
tracting in the near future.
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Notes
1. We use the phrase ‘natural resource rents’ (NRR) throughout the article to refer to the amount 
of revenue generated from the extraction and sale of natural resources. Other terms sometimes 
used for this in the literature include ‘natural resource wealth’, ‘natural resource income’ and 
‘natural resource revenue’. We use the phrase ‘natural resource extraction’ only when refer-
ring explicitly to the act of extraction.
2. That term was later modified and is now known as ‘the natural resource curse’ (see Frankel, 
2010).
3. Gelb (1988) also examined this idea through the study of oil-producing states. Specifically, he 
examined how oil revenues in the 1970s helped and harmed developing oil exporters.
4. Although there is considerable support for the relationship between natural resource wealth 
and violence, not all researchers find that relationship. For instance, Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2009) discovered that natural resource riches do not increase violence for the 97 coun-
tries they studied between 1960 and 2004.
5. Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 5) note that, for their variables, ‘there is little variation over time 
[and as a result] there is a loss of efficiency in examining within country differences’. As a 
result, they relied on a cross-sectional analysis of homicide rates.
6. Many cross-sectional studies of homicide rates include the percentage of males aged 15–24 
in their analyses to account for the fact that this is often seen as a group that commits a high 
level of crime. These data are not available for all of the countries in the analysis for all of the 
years. Therefore we include the age structure and the percent female variables as proxies.
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Table 2. List of countries in the analysis (N = 173).
Afghanistan Equatorial Guinea Mexico Tajikistan
Albania Eritrea Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Tanzania
Algeria Estonia Moldova Thailand
Angola Ethiopia Mongolia Timor-Leste
Argentina Fiji Montenegro Togo
Armenia Finland Morocco Tonga
Aruba France Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago
Australia Gabon Namibia Tunisia
Austria Gambia, The Nepal Turkey
Azerbaijan Georgia Netherlands Turkmenistan
Bahamas, The Germany New Zealand Uganda
Bahrain Ghana Nicaragua Ukraine
Bangladesh Greece Niger United Arab Emirates
Barbados Guatemala Nigeria United Kingdom
Belarus Guyana Norway United States
Belgium Haiti Oman Uruguay
Belize Honduras Pakistan Uzbekistan
Benin Hong Kong SAR, 
China
Panama Vanuatu
Bhutan Hungary Papua New Guinea Venezuela, RB
Bolivia India Paraguay Vietnam
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina
Indonesia Peru Yemen, Rep.
Botswana Iran, Islamic Rep. Philippines Zambia
Brazil Iraq Poland Zimbabwe
Brunei Darussalam Ireland Portugal  
Bulgaria Israel Qatar  
Burkina Faso Italy Romania  
Burundi Jamaica Russian Federation  
Cabo Verde Japan Rwanda  
Cambodia Jordan Samoa  
Cameroon Kazakhstan Sao Tome and 
Principe
 
Canada Kenya Saudi Arabia  
Central African  
Republic
Kiribati Senegal  
Chad Kosovo Serbia  
Chile Kuwait Seychelles  
China Kyrgyz Republic Sierra Leone  
Colombia Lao PDR Slovak Republic  
Comoros Latvia Slovenia  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Lebanon Solomon Islands  
Congo, Rep. Lesotho South Africa  
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Costa Rica Liberia South Sudan  
Croatia Libya Spain  
Cyprus Lithuania Sri Lanka  
Czech Republic Luxembourg St. Lucia  
Denmark Macao SAR, China St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
 
Djibouti Macedonia, FYR Sudan  
Dominica Madagascar Suriname  
Dominican Republic Malawi Swaziland  
Ecuador Malaysia Sweden  
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mali Switzerland  
El Salvador Mauritania Syrian Arab Republic  
Table 2. (Continued)
Appendix 2
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables in the analysis.
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Natural log of homicide 1.42 1.24
Natural log of natural resource rents 1.33 1.89
GDP per capita (US$ 000) 1.00 1.58
Gini 40.46 9.99
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 33.20 29.25
Percent unemployed 9.04 6.34
Foreign direct investment (US$ 000) 0.01 0.01
Percent urban 53.91 23.23
Population (billion) 0.04 0.14
Democracy (Freedom Index) 4.64 2.09
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 6.86 2.14
Percent aged 0–14 years 30.56 10.83
Percent aged 15–64 years 62.10 7.06
Percent female 50.02 2.86
Region Percent countries in region  
 East Asia & Pacific 13.87  
 Europe & Central Asia 27.75  
 Latin America & Caribbean 17.34  
 Middle East & North Africa 10.98  
 North America 1.16  
 South Asia 4.05  
 Sub-Saharan Africa 24.86  
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Appendix 3
Table 4. Between and within variance.
Variable Between Within
Natural log homicide 1.26 0.07
Natural log resource rents 5.02 0.18
GDP per capita (US$ 000) 2.21 0.26
Gini 87.80 6.86
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 820.25 40.20
Percent unemployed 36.60 3.76
Foreign direct investment (US$ 000) 0.00004 0.0001
Percent urban 539.17 3.17
Population (billion) 0.02 0.0000004
Democracy (Freedom Index) 4.12 0.28
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 4.24 0.15
Percent aged 0–14 years 114.38 2.85
Percent aged 15–64 years 47.57 2.33
Percent female 7.92 0.27
Table 5. Description of missing values.
Variable Number of missing cases Percent missing
Natural log homicide 915 40.68
Natural log resource rents 177 7.87
GDP per capita (US$ 000) 21 0.93
Gini 1630 72.48
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 52 2.31
Percent unemployed 233 10.36
Foreign direct investment (US$ 000) 60 2.67
Percent urban 15 0.67
Population (billion) 0 0.00
Democracy (Freedom Index) 361 16.05
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 484 21.52
Percent aged 0–14 years 0 0.00
Percent aged 15–64 years 0 0.00
Percent female 0 0.00
Note: The dataset has a total of 2249 country-years, therefore the percentages in the table are derived from 
dividing the number of missing cases by 2249.
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